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1. INTRODUCTION 
The link between traffic offences and accident 
involvement has been frequently made, both at 
an individual and aggregate level (e.g. Evans, 
1991). Indeed, it is estimated that by reducing 
speeding alone a casualty reduction of between 
30 and 50% could be effected, while preventing 
close-following and driver impairment due to 
drugs or alcohol would enhance safety still 
further (see Rothengatter, 1989). Individual ten- 
dencies to commit violations are not the concern 
here, instead this paper will focus on the attempts 
which have been made to change drivers’ 
behaviour in general, i.e. at an aggregate level. 
To this end the paper will review the literature 
relating to various attempts to increase compli- 
ance with the traffic law, it will consider various 
theoretical contexts in which their results might 
be understood, and will briefly present some ve- 
ry recent empirical work relating to increased 
compliance, which serves to clarify some of the 
theoretical issues raised and to specify the limits 
which may apply to such interventions. 
2. MEASURING COMPLIANCE 
While the points made below are intended to 
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have general application, the focus in this docu- 
ment is on the seven illegal activities which were 
originally of direct concern to the E.C. project 
DETER, within which the empirical research 
reported below was carried out. These offences 
were: speeding, close following, illegal overta- 
king, illicit use of restricted lane, red light vio- 
lation, flouting of weight restrictions and driving 
while impaired. In fact, the focus of the paper is 
sharper still, i.e. on the range of behaviours which 
have been extensively researched and against 
which countermeasures have been introduced: 
excessive speed and inadequate headways. 
Much of the research effort in attempting to 
increase compliance has been confined to drun- 
ken-driving, excessive speed, and red-light vio- 
lation. The ways in which researchers have 
sought to measure the effects of efforts to increa- 
se compliance may be divided into two broad 
classes: those which have consequences for the 
perpetrator andlor the relevant authorities, and 
those that reflect changes in normative behaviour. 
The first class of measures relates largely to 
the number of prosecutions for a particular 
offence, the numbers and types of accidents 
occurring as a consequence of such offences, the 
costs of these accidents, or the economic costs of 
enforcement of the laws which had been viola- 
ted. The second broad class of measures can also 
be subdivided into a number of sub-categories. 
These include physical measures such as the 
average speed or blood-alcohol-level, or inci- 
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dence of seat-belt use, the variability or range of 
observed speeds, reductions in the numbers i n  
particular target groups (e.g. high speeders) and 
the temporal (e.g. time after intervention has 
ceased) or spatial (e.g. the so-called speed halo) 
longevity of any effect. What might be termeld 
non-physical measures, such as attitudes towards 
the behaviour in question, future intentions to 
commit such an act (i.e. behavioural intentions:), 
or self-reported involvement in such behaviours 
form the other category. 
Two forms of control are used on the size of 
the effects observed. Taking measures before and 
after, as well as simply during, the intervention 
is the most widely adopted control. However, a 
number of studies also employ measurements of 
sites or areas or groups that are outside the inten- 
ded impact of the programme, so that effects 
which are independent of the intervention are not 
misattributed to the intervention being evaluated. 
For example, assessing the effect of a change i n  
the layout of a junction during an oil shortage 
would not be wise without also measuring the accident 
rates at comparable control sites. 
3. ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE 
Three classes of action have been undertaken 
with the aim of increasing compliance. These ha- 
ve attempted to (a) increase the likelihood of de- 
tection or apprehension, (b) increase the conse- 
quences of detection or apprehension, and (c) 
change the public perception of the illegal action 
and those involved in it (e.g. through public edu- 
cation programmes). Often these have been used 
in conjunction with one another and the effects 
of these interventions will now be reviewed in 
some detail. 
3.1. Increasing likelihood of detection 
Efforts to increase detection by manipulating 
policing have taken two forms: by altering tradi- 
tional enforcement techniques or the introduc- 
tion of new ones. Most detailed research has 
concerned the use of enforcement vehicles to re- 
duce speeding, and these will be considered i n  
some detail because of the clear link between 
speed violations and accident involvement, and 
because of its intrinsic relationship to one major 
explanation of why people choose to comply. 
Studies which have attempted to assess the 
effects of parked marked police vehicles yield 
the following conclusions. Hauer, Ahlin, Bowser 
(1980) have showed that a marked vehicle par- 
ked parallel to the roadway (facing in the same 
direction as the traffic in the adjacent carriage- 
way) reduces the average speed of free-flowing 
vehicles to the posted speed at site of enforce- 
ment. More importantly perhaps there was a 
demonstrable ((halo effect)) on the average speed 
for both downstream and upstream traffic. The 
data reveal an exponential function halving eve- 
ry 900 meters from the site of enforcement. 
This confirms earlier research by Jocelyn et a1 
(1971), and later work by Roop and Brackett 
(1981). Roop and Brackett (1981), however, 
who employed the additional control of asses- 
sing changes on matched sites where no enforce- 
ment was carried out during the duration of the 
project, show that the level of effects reported by 
earlier authors were somewhat attenuated if the 
effects on the control sites were taken into 
account. Nevertheless, the magnitude of effects 
was greater for the enforced sites. There was a 
1.8% decrease in mean speed, a decrease of 9.1% in 
vehicles exceeding posted speed (which was 55 
mph), and 10.9% in percent of vehicles exce- 
eding 60 mph. Interestingly, Roop and Brackett 
also report a drop in accident rates for the enfor- 
ced sites. When corrected for the effects at the 
control sites there was a 2.9% reduction in da- 
mage only accidents, a 11.5% reduction in per- 
sonal injury accidents, and a 15.3% in fatal accidents. 
What these studies also show is that the va- 
riability of speed differed as a function of the 
amount of exposure to enforcement, and that this 
reduction in variability occurs only when the 
enforcement persists for more than one day. 
Hauer, Ahlin, Bowser (1980) show that with a 
single day of enforcement, the residual effect on 
the average speed was already reduced on the 
following day. The effect was completely dissi- 
pated in three days. In contrast, when enforce- 
ment was maintained for five consecutive days, a 
residual effect was still noted six days after the 
intervention had ceased. Brackett and Beecher 
(1 980) varied the enforcement schedule by 
parking the vehicle five days a week for the first 
two weeks, four days for the second two weeks, 
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and twice a week for the last two weeks. Compa- 
rison of the pre- and post experimental condi- 
tions indicated a significant speed reduction of 4 
mph and a halo effect extending up to 11 miles. 
There are therefore demonstrable, if short 
term, effects of using parked marked enforce- 
ment vehicles on average speed, speed variabi- 
lity, number of high speeders and the size of halo 
effects as well as on accident frequencies. Other 
types of intervention using enforcement vehicles 
have also been evaluated. Specifically, presu- 
mably in an attempt to demonstrate the readiness 
of the police to apprehend offenders, researchers 
have examined the effect of simulating a road- 
side arrest (i.e. unmarked vehicle stopped in front 
of police unit). Such manipulations have been 
shown to have reduced or no effect when con- 
trasted with a single parallel parked marked car. 
Only Jocelyn et al. (1 971) suggest that the arrest 
position configuration is more effective in redu- 
cing speed than the single parallel parked mar- 
ked car, while many others indicate that this con- 
figuration of vehicles has no (positive) demons- 
trable effect. Indeed, not even Jocelyn et a1 show 
that the arrest configuration is completely 
effective, since there appears to be marked 
reduction in the size of the speed halo effect (2% 
within a mile versus 4% for the other configura- 
tions). 
Parked marked vehicles are in general consi- 
dered to have greater potential to reduce viola- 
tions than moving ones (see Council (1970), Jo- 
celyn et al. (1971)). Jocelyn et a1 report that the size 
of speed reduction was identical for stationary 
and moving vehicles but the location of the ma- 
ximum speed reduction varied, being somewhat 
more extended for the moving enforcement 
vehicle. The halo effect was larger for the statio- 
nary vehicle, and for vehicles travellingfacing in 
the same direction than in the opposite direction. Shi- 
nar and Stiebel(l984) obtained similar reductions 
to or below the speed limit for both stationary 
and moving vehicles. However they repori that 
the distance over which the halo effect operated 
was greater. A number of authors indicate that 
the use of unmarked police vehicles tends to have 
very little effect ovedl (see Shinar, & McKnight, 
1986). 
Taken together these findings indicate that 
making the threat of detection more evident, and 
increasing the apparent readiness of the police 
vehicle to pursue and enforce the law lead to si- 
gnificant reductions in speed and accidents. 
They also indicate that the length time for which 
the enforcement vehicle was visible is related to 
the longevity of these effect, but not in a linear 
fashion. 
The other aspect of increasing detection likeli- 
hood which has received some study, is that of 
increasing that actual amount of enforcement. 
Cirillo (1968) has demonstrated that the level of 
enforcement on a section of road had little or no 
apparent effect on speeding, with the number of 
hours of police patrol and the number of arrests 
being unrelated to mean speed or accident rate. 
Similarly, van Houten and Nau (1981) show 
that for roads with 30 or 60 minutes of overt po- 
licing per day, the speeds measured when the 
patrols were absent show no consistent effect of 
the increased enforcement. 
The only extensive analysis of an automated 
on-site enforcement system indicates that where 
the uncertainty is removed from the detection 
and apprehension the effects of increased enfor- 
cement are very large indeed. ORBIS developed 
by Vought Missiles and Space Company, as des- 
cribed by Shinar and McKnight (1986) takes a 
front-end picture of the vehicle with its licence 
plate, the recorded speed, the violation time, date 
and location, followed by prosecution (Jones et 
al, 1980) 800 vehicles per day exceeded speed 
limit by 10 or more mph, was reduced by half in 
one week (before it was actually in operation) 
and continued decrease to a stable level of 15 to 
25 vehicles per day. 
3.2. Increasing consequences of detection 
Attempts have also been made to manipulate 
commission of illegal behaviour by changing the 
consequences of being detected. Although intui- 
tively appealing, the notion that legal threats will 
successfully deter behaviour to the extent that 
they are perceived as ((swift, certain and severe)) 
has had little confirmation in empirical studies of 
the criminal law, (see Zimring, & Hawkins, 
1973; ROSS, & Lafee, 1985). Much, but not all, 
of the research effort in this area of driver be- 
haviour has concentrated on attempts to reduce 
drunk-driving. Shinar and McKnight conclude 
that any effect of increased severity of penalties 
lasts only as long as the increased enforcement, 
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and that ctas enforcement declines to original 
levels, so does the effect, even though the more: 
severe penalties remain in force)). (Shinar, &. 
McKnight, 1985, p. 388). 
In fact, in Europe, in recent years we have: 
seen the abandonment of the most severe drin- 
king-driving penalties. The reduced penalties 
do not appear to have negatively influenced the: 
extent of drinking and driving (Ross, 1990) 
Conversely, in North America, the severity of 
legal punishments has been increased in nume- 
rous independent jurisdictions. Currently, all 
states mandate jail or community service for se- 
cond-offender drinking-drivers, and some man- 
date jail for the first offence. Evaluations of first- 
offender jail policies in Tennessee (Jones et al., 
1987) and Arizona (Ross, et al 1990) found no 
measurable effect, either on the recidivism of the 
offenders or, through general deterrence, on the 
driving public. No evidence of deterrence was 
found for a local policy of 15 days in jail for the: 
first offenders in an Ohio city (Ross, & Voas, 
1989). In an Australian study, Home1 (1988) found 
no impact of jail sentences of different length on 
subsequent recidivism. In Canada, Vingilis (1 990) 
found that, for repeat offenders, longer jail sen- 
tences were associated with greater recidivism. 
Much earlier Campbell and Ross (1968) perfor- 
med an analysis of a crackdown on speeding in 
Connecticut which involved stricter penalties. A, 
time series analysis of the data obtained did not 
reveal any significant change in the number of fata- 
lities. 
From a psychological point of view the failure 
to produce effects through increasing the severi- 
ty of apprehension is not surprising. A whole 
variety of theories of learning predict that like- 
lihood of punishment rather than the severity O F  
any punishment is the effective agent. This must 
be particularly true of situations where the a 
priori likelihood of the event is itself very small. 
Thus the catastrophic effect of dying in a traffic 
accident may give rise to a subjective feeling of 
risk, but deters very few motorists from actually 
driving. This would obviously occur if severity 
alone was considered to be important. 
3.3. Effects of providing drivers with infor- 
mation 
Another way in which reductions in illegal 
driving acts have been sought is through the use 
of public information campaigns. While many 
authors (e.g. Rooijers, & De Bruin, 1990; Rein- 
furt, Levine, & Johnson, 1973; Shinar, & 
McKnight, 1985) readily support the view that 
media or public information campaigns can add 
to the effects of enforcement, it remains to be de- 
monstrated that public information alone has 
any effect on violations (see Rothengatter, 1990). 
Reinfurt, Levine and Johnson (1 973) confined 
their evaluation activities to urban areas with a 
posted speed limit of 35 mph. Vehicle speeds 
were recorded for a period of 11 days divided 
among 3 phases: 1-2, 4-7 and 9-1 1 days. News 
releases and public service announcements ctadver- 
tising) enforcement activities were published in 
local newspapers on the exact day when a par- 
ticular experimental phase began. The results de- 
monstrated that the addition of newspaper publi- 
city to the visible patrolhadar configuration 
yielded a significant reduction in the average 
speed from 36.6 mph to 35.5  mph (p<O.OOl). 
The percent of vehicles exceeding the speed 
limit by 15 mph also was significantly reduced, 
from 1.8 to 0.7% (p<O.Ol). A similar pattern of 
results was obtained when the effect of publicity 
was evaluated relative to a visible police unit 
with a concealed radar unit. Thus, the results 
clearly indicated that the addition of public 
information to an enforcement program adds to 
the effect of the enforcement unit. Local media 
were used in this campaign, and this is generally 
seen to be most effective, since it more easily 
targets the relevant audience than national me- 
dia. Similarly, dissemination of information 
about enforcement activities appears both more 
effective (and more cost effective) if (mews)) 
rather than ctfeatures)) carry the items. As Wilde 
et al. (1971) point out, the other desirable or 
essential features of public education campaigns 
are that the message has <(interest)) or crappeal)) 
(which can frequently be achieved through hu- 
mour or controversy), that the message specifies 
the target behaviour precisely (rather than simply 
urges people to be ((better people))). In general, 
the aim is to produce messages with precise con- 
tent which become part of ordinary conversation, 
rather than some instruction divorced from eve- 
ryday living. This not only boosts the coverage 
achieved by the campaign but may also have a 
collateral effect by allowing individuals to 
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explicitly consider their own behaviour against 
more clearly stated social norms (see below). 
What is clear from a variety of studies is that 
unenforced posted roadside information has little 
measurable effect on behaviour. Galizio, Jackson 
and Steele (1979), for example, demonstrated 
that the presence of police cars had reduced dri- 
ving speed, but that a standard ((radar-enforced)) 
speed limit sign had no effect on driving speed. 
Hunter and Bundy (1 975) also failed to find any 
significant effects of such a sign. It should be 
noted, however, that such studies do not mean 
that roadside signs are ineffective, simply that 
their effectiveness depends on the extent to 
which they are valid predictors of increased en- 
forcement for the individual motorist. For exam- 
ple, frequent pairings of ((Speed Check Zone)) 
signs and enforcement by Dart and Hunter 
(1976) show that signs can be as effective as a 
marked parked police car and as a marked par- 
ked car in arrest position. During the interven- 
tion the percentage of drivers exceeding speed 
limit reduction from 43% to 8.5%, and a speed 
halo effect was established for up to 1.9 miles 
down stream from the site. However, one would 
have to be sceptical about the longevity of 
effects of this sort, since the signs will obviously 
become less powerful predictors of increased en- 
forcement activity as time elapses and enforce- 
ment resources are directed elsewhere. 
The conclusion from such research is that if 
they do not predict an increase in the likelihood 
of detection, signs of such general content have 
very little effect. At the other extreme, i.e. signs 
carrying content which is specific to a single 
driver, the results appear equally clear and 
similarly disappointing. Efforts, for instance, 
have also been made to increase compliance 
with speed limits by presenting drivers with a 
visual indication of their current speed (Visual 
Speed Indication). Dart and Hunter (1 976) used 
a loop of speed detector and a large programma- 
ble roadside sign which displayed an individual 
driver’s speed (((Your speed is XXXD). Where 
the speed exceeded the speed limit the speed 
information was preceded by the message (ctslow 
down>,). The effects of these individual messages 
were evaluated under a variety of conditions: 
three conditions where VSI and different confi- 
gurations of police cars were paired, VSI only, 
and a control condition where no intervention 
was made. The only significant speed reductions 
occurred where the VSI was paired with enforce- 
ment. For VSI alone, an absence of any effect on 
speed was noted not only at the site of the speed 
detection loops, but also at 500 feet, 1,000 feet 
and 1.9 miles downstream of the VSI. This indi- 
cates that the mere presentation of information 
regarding vehicle speed, even when coupled with a 
specific instruction to slow down, has no mea- 
surable effect on compliance. A similar conclu- 
sion is reached by (Hunter, Bundy, & Daniel, 
1976) for VSI only information. Importantly, 
Hunter et al. additionally suggests that the effect 
VSI may be to increase speed variance, indica- 
ting that drivers may react to personalised infor- 
mation on speed in very different ways. Obvi- 
ously, any intervention which serves to increase 
variance at a site must be treated with extreme 
caution. 
Thus far it would appear that neither what 
might be termed ((passive)) sources of informa- 
tion (i.e.: general information which is presented 
whatever the driver does) and what might be 
termed ((active)) information (where the informa- 
tion is contingent upon each individual’s beha- 
viour) do not themselves reduce speeding. How- 
ever, in a study to which we devote much atten- 
tion below, van Houten and colleagues report a 
range of speed reductions which are due to a 
technique which combines both active and pas- 
sive information, that is, so called ((collective 
feedback)). This involves the posting of the num- 
ber of vehicles exceeding speed limits in, for 
example, the previous week. 
The first two studies reported by van Houten 
et al. (van Houten, Nau and Marini, 1980) in- 
volved the use of a sign measuring 1.2m by 
2.lm, located 2m from side of the road, 2.3m 
above surface of the pavement. On it were dis- 
played ((Drivers not speeding yesterday)) and 
below a line ((Best record)) in letters (15.2 cm 
high) and percentage of figures 15.2 cm (for best 
record) or 20.3 (Yesterday) high. The percenta- 
ges were changed, as appropriate, each day on 
the basis of speed recordings at the site during 
two daily periods of 20 minutes of observation 
(Monday to Friday, 10.30 and 14.30). The speed 
limit at the site was 50 km/h, but only vehicles 
travelling at 66 km/h or more were reflected in 
the posted speed information. During the period 
of the study the average number of cars contribu- 
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TABLE 1 
Speed distribution in a 50 km/h zone as a function ofposted speed formation 
(after van Hoiyten et al., 1980) 
Condition Percentage of drives exceeding: 
Observation No. Weeks 
Baseline 1 (no sign) 8 
Baseline 2 (covered) 5 
Daily posting 2 6 
No numbers 2 2 
No numbers 3 2 
Follow up 26 
Daily posting 1 5 
Daily posting 3 4 
Weekly posting 1 3 
Weekly posting 2 5 
74Km/h 
6% 
3 yo 
9% 
1 Yo 
2% 
2% 
6% 
2% 
2% 
9% 
66Kmh 
12% 
26% 
8% 
12% 
34% 
11% 
22% 
11% 
12% 
24% 
58Km/h 
63% 
40% 
63% 
39% 
45% 
72% 
45% 
61% 
44% 
45% 
5 1 Km/h 
90% 
78% 
93% 
93% 
84% 
95% 
85% 
91% 
86% 
85% 
ting to the speed information was 244 cars per 
day (range 201 to 286) and police activity in the 
area was kept to constant level (similar to that 
pertaining before the posting of  speed 
information). The major findings are reported in 
Table 1 ,  which is derived from the figures 
presented in the text of their paper. 
The effects of this intervention were impressi- 
ve. The mere presence of the sign had little effect 
(i.e. no-sign versus sign covered by tarpaulin, 
that is Baseline 1 versus Baseline 2). The sign 
without numerical information also had no 
effect. However, instatement or re-instatement of 
the daily percentage information substantially 
reduces speeds greater than the cut off point of 
66 k d h .  There are reductions in the percentages 
of drivers travelling at less that these levels, but 
rate of reduction declines as the actual speed de- 
clines. This of course means that both the avera- 
ge speed at the site, and the variance in speed at 
the site were reduced by the posting of speed in- 
formation. Two other aspects of the data tabula- 
ted above are worthy of note. Firstly, altering the 
sign (and the data contributing to it) from 
((Drivers speeding yesterday)) to ((Drivers spee- 
ding last week)) had little effect, and secondly, 
the reductions achieved remained stable over a 
26 week period (during which speed was still 
unobtrusively measured and updated information 
was posted). Thus, van Houten et a1 appear to 
have demonstrated a way of reducing speeding 
behaviour. This interpretation is corroborated by 
two other types of data they report in their paper. 
The average number of accidents in the two 
years preceding the study was ((a stable level of 
1.56 per month), (op. cit., p. 392) reduced to 0.67 
per month following the installation of the sign. 
Furthermore, the mean numbers of drivers char- 
ged with speeding averaged 0.75 and 0.71 per 
day during the baseline and no-numbers condi- 
tions, but this decreased to 0.47 per day during 
the daily posting and 0.25 per day during the 
weekly posting conditions. These reductions 
may of course reflect a reduction in the attention 
given to speeding by the local police (which van 
Houten et al. claim was kept constant), but even 
if this were true, this would probably compromi- 
se any attempt to account for these findings in 
terms of an increase in the objective (or actual ) 
risk of being charged with speeding. 
In a later study, van Houten and Nau (1981) 
replicated these effects and contrasted the effects 
of posting speed information with different le- 
vels of obvious/visible police enforcement. As 
before, speeds were unobtrusively measured, but 
not when police units were deployed. During pe- 
riods of increased enforcement (30 minutes 
versus 60 minutes of ((parked marked)) police 
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presence on the two sites) the posted speed feedback 
sign was covered. As discussed above, the pre- 
sence of police does indeed serve to reduce 
speeds (see also Galizio, Jackson, & Steele, 
1979), but only while visible and in a position to 
enforce. Van Houten and Nau do not report the 
speed reduction in these conditions, but clearly 
demonstrate that the speeds on increased enfor- 
cement days (no measurements during periods of 
actual enforcement) was substantially higher 
than on the posted speed days. Thus the results 
are consistent with their earlier study, and streng- 
then the view that the basis of the reduction in 
speeds owes little if anything to any implied in- 
creased level of police activity. 
To summarise the effects from both studies, it 
would appear that these signs are capable of 
reducing speed by as much as 15% the numbers 
of drivers operating well in excess of posted 
speed limits. Furthermore, these feedback signs 
did not produce ((over-reaction)), that is, an in- 
crease in the percent of drivers operating well 
under the limit, which is often a consequence of 
overt police enforcement (see Galizio, Jackson, 
& Steele, 1979). Shinar and McKnight (1985), 
attribute a number of other findings to van 
Houten and Nau, which we presume are reported 
in van Houten and Nau (1983), these are as 
follows. The higher or more lenient the speed 
used as a criterion on the sign, the greater the 
effect in reducing dangerous speeding, the sign 
was not as effective in producing compliance as 
a the presence of a marked vehicle at the enforce- 
ment site. On limited access highways the effect 
of the sign endured for up to 6 km downstream. 
This speed halo effect was greatest for drivers 
exceeding the speed limit by the largest amounts, 
but adding the insignia or name of an enforcement 
agency to the sign did not enhance compliance 
with speed limits. Finally, and rather impressively, 
in their 1981 paper van Houten and Nau briefly 
mention that the first speed sign installation 
was still effective some 20 months after its 
erection. 
4. UNDERSTANDING INCREASED 
COMPLIANCE 
In the preceding sections the factors which 
appear to enhance compliance with the traffic 
law have been considered in some detail. Briefly, 
it would appear that while the presence of a po- 
lice enforcement unit ready to enforce the law is 
undoubtedly the most effective deterrent, the 
duration of these effects is rather limited, both 
((within)) an enforcement episode, and between 
enforcement episodes. Thus, downstream from 
the site of a police unit, speed gradually increa- 
ses again, and on days where enforcement is ab- 
sent, the ambient speed gradually reverts to the 
pre-intervention level even at the sites themsel- 
ves. The duration of the enforcement episodes 
does, however, influence the rate of this rever- 
sion, an indication that drivers learn and remem- 
ber the ((enforcement history)) of a particular 
site. Taken together, these results indicate that 
drivers adjust their behaviour to their expecta- 
tions regarding the likely detection of their 
offence. This ((subjective risk of detection)), ra- 
ther than the ((objective)) or actual risk of de- 
tection is what influences behaviour, as eviden- 
ced by the failure of researchers to demonstrate 
any reliable effects of the amount of enforce- 
ment. 
That drivers are insensitive to levels of objec- 
tive risk has previously been demonstrated for 
the risk of accident by Groeger and Chapman 
(1991). Earlier work in the accident-risk area, 
which demonstrates that driver’s estimates of 
risk can be biased by available (but irrelevant) 
information (Groeger, & Chapman, 1990), offers 
a possible framework within which these and 
other results reported above can be understood. 
Specifically, drivers rely on easily available in- 
formation about themselves and their environ- 
ment to guide their behaviour, rather than any 
exhaustive interrogation of themselves or of the 
current driving task. Thus, when a highly visible 
police unit is detected, or remembered, beha- 
viour is adjusted, otherwise it plays no role. In 
other words, objective risk is only important and 
influential in behaviour in so far as it is corre- 
lated with the aspects of the scene which give 
rise to the driver’s feeling of subjective risk. 
This may also help to account for the consistent 
absence of any effect of the severity of detection. 
Another set of results bears upon this issue. 
Groeger and Grande (in press) show that in the 
absence of information to the contrary, drivers 
assess their ability very positively in comparison 
to a novice driver. Where feedback on their abi- 
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lity is provided, by for example a driving ins- 
tructor, their view of their own ability in relation 
to that of others is altered by this previously una- 
vailable view of their own ability. Thus, we suggest 
drivers rely on the information that is available 
to them from the scene, and their own and other 
driver’s ability. When, as in the case of the 
collective feedback regime reported by van 
Houten and Nau, more veridical information 
about others is provided, the driver’s own per- 
formance or self assessment can be adjusted to 
conform with it. This may not necessarily be a 
pressure to conform, but a recalibration of some 
assessment of what others do. Thus, we would 
suggest that where the other traffic travelling in 
the scene conflicts with the posted ((normative 
speed information)), the prevailing speed choice 
rather than the posted norm will exert the prima- 
ry influence. It should also be borne in mind that 
any pressure to conform may be less powerful 
than the goal which exceeding the speed limit 
may satisfy, and this too would mitigate against 
complete adjustment towards legal speeds. Both 
of these suggestions would imply that speed 
changes will be greater the more excessive the 
speed is, which is borne out by available eviden- 
ce. 
Shinar and McKnight (1986) give a rather different 
account of the enforcement and feedback effects 
presented above. In essence, they suggest that 
the threat of enforcement implied by the scene is 
what governs speeding, stressing as we do that 
subjective rather that objective risks are what 
influence behaviour. This implied threat account 
is not, intuitively at least, consistent with the 
collective feedback results given above. For 
example, the objective risk of being apprehended 
was obviously substantially reduced in the van 
Houten studies. A lack of correlation between 
subjective and objective risk does not, of course, 
disprove the ((implied threat)) account. However, 
the fact that ((collective feedback)) but not ((indi- 
vidual feedback)) are associated with speed re- 
ductions, would appear to be more awkward for 
the Shinar and McKnight position to account for, 
since one must surely presume that the ((threat)) 
implied by feedback on your own behaviour 
must surely be more influential than the knowle- 
dge that statistics have being collected on others’ 
behaviour. 
In discussing their own results, van Houten 
and Nau discuss a number of possible causal me- 
chanisms. They claim, quite reasonably, that 
since the number of drivers charged with spee- 
ding declined, the compliance effect is unlikely 
to have been the result of increased ticketing on 
the part of the police. Another possibility that 
they raise is that the change in the behaviour of 
drivers is reinforced by the improvement in 
percentage of drivers not speeding. This does not 
account for the erratic increases and decreases 
over time evident in their papers. A strict rein- 
forcement would suggest a linear decline until, 
perhaps, some plateau is reached. Another pos- 
sible explanation they discuss is that of implied 
surveillance, raised later by Shinar and McKnight. 
However, van Houten and colleagues conclude, 
perhaps hastily, that an implied surveillance 
account is in conflict with that fact that changes 
made to the sign were not significantly 
correlated with increased ticketing or additional 
surveillance. It is also worth considering the pos- 
sibility that the daily changes in the information 
should suggest a greater increase in surveillance 
than do weekly postings. In neither of the van 
Houten et a1 studies is there any difference bet- 
ween daily and weekly postings. They also raise 
two other possible explanations, that a ((chain 
reaction)) is caused by the brake lights of com- 
pliant motorists, which itself becomes reinfor- 
cing. However, their methods of data collection 
are insufficiently precise to distinguish between 
cases where vehicles were travelling alone or in con- 
voy. 
The final possibility they raise is that the collective 
feedback sign comes to acquire discriminative 
control over driver behaviour, because of ((social 
comparison)), but they fail to indicate why such a 
comparison should influence behaviour. Social 
comparison is, of course, a fundamental aspect 
of Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) Theory of Reaso- 
ned Action (TRA), which has much contributed 
to our understanding of volitional behaviour. 
Briefly, TRA states that behaviour is immedia- 
tely preceded by a behavioural intention, and 
that such intentions are formed by the joint 
action of the attitude to the behaviour and the 
individual’s subjective norms. The attitude to the 
behaviour is itself formed by the product of indi- 
vidual’s behavioural beliefs (about consequen- 
ces) and the evaluation of the outcome (i.e. its 
seriousness of consequences). Subjective norms 
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FIGURE 1 
Theory of Reasoned Action (after Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) 
Behavioural Intention = Attitude to behaviour * Subjective Norms 
= (behavioural beliefs * outcome evaluation) * (normative beliefs * motivation to comply) 
FIGURE 2 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (after Ajzen, 1985) 
Behavioural Intention = Attitude to behaviour * Subjective Norms 
= (behavioural beliefs * outcome evaluation) 
* (normative beliefs * motivation to comply) 
* perceived behavioural control 
are themselves the product of the individual’s 
normative beliefs (regarding the social expecta- 
tions about that behaviour) and his or her 
motivation to comply (see Figure 1). 
This theory was later extended to incorporate 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) by 
Ajzen (1985, 1988), in an effort to provide an 
extension to the non volitional domain. TPB simply 
added a single term perceived behavioural con- 
trol, i.e. the ease of performing the activity or of 
avoiding it. It is worth noting that for Ajzen, per- 
ceived behavioural control is altogether different 
from more global notions of controllability and 
locus of control popular in the early seventies, 
since for him perceived behavioural control, is 
tied to a specific behaviour in terms of time, 
action, target and context (see Figure 2). 
The increased explanatory power of TPB over 
TRA for behavioural intentions to drink and 
drive, speed, close follow, and to overtake dan- 
gerously has recently been tested by Parker, 
Manstead, Stradling, Reason, and Baxter (1 992). 
Parker et a1 show that the inclusion of ((control)) 
as a term, allowed significantly more of variance 
to be accounted for in a large (N= 881) sample 
of British drivers ratings their future intentions 
to commit the actions described in four simple 
verbal descriptions of the offences referred to 
above. This demonstrates the applicability of the 
TPB to freely expressed ((behavioural inten- 
tions)) if not to actual behaviour, and indicates 
that drivers feel that such activities are not ne- 
cessarily l l l y  under their own control. Obviously, 
until such theories actually predict how people 
perform in real or simulated situations, TPB is 
an interesting description of, rather than an ex- 
planation of, people’s commission of illegal 
acts. In terms of the van Houten and Nau rese- 
arch, one would presume that the behavioural 
control over reducing speed is high and that the 
normative beliefs are enhanced by the provision 
of collective feedback. Given the findings, if we 
adopt the TPB, we have to assume that the moti- 
vation to comply is high, but given the formu- 
lation of the theory (i.e. the fact that behavioural 
intentions are the product of the sub-compo- 
nents), we are also forced to assume that the 
drivers consider their detection likely, and that 
they consider the seriousness of such detection 
great. As we have seen from the earlier discus- 
sion of this area, there is little evidence to sup- 
port such assumptions. Thus, while useful des- 
criptively, one must conclude that TPB requires 
substantially more confirmatory evidence before 
we can accept it as an accurate explanation of 
behaviour in traffic. 
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5. ADVISORY STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING 
COMPLIANCE 
As part of our research effort within the DETER 
project, Peter Chapman and I have had the 
opportunity to explore the types of effects re- 
ported by van Houten and Nau. We chose to do 
so in a controlled laboratory setting using an Animated 
Interactive Driving Environment (AIDE, see Groeger, 
& Chapman, submitted). AIDE is a driving task, 
based on Macintosh Computer, which was speci- 
fically developed so that we could investigate 
what types and combinations of messages were 
most effective in encouraging drivers to make 
compliant decisions. These studies revealed that 
where posted information on normative behavi- 
our with respect to speeding was presented, dri- 
vers in this laboratory based task were less 
likely to break the speed limit. However, there 
were two important caveats to this general fining 
which was revealed in a further series of AIDE 
experiments. Specifically, drivers did not beco- 
me more compliant in general, law-abidingness 
increased only for the posted offence. Thus, 
drivers did not commit fewer tailgating viola- 
tions, red light violations, overtaking violations, 
etc. The second important finding from these 
studies was that posting normative information 
about speeding was effective only when the 
incidence of actual speeding encountered during 
the trial was low. Where the behaviour of other 
drivers appeared to be at variance with the 
posted information, it did not reduce speeding. 
These findings, if true, suggest that posting of 
normative information is not effective because of 
the increased surveillance such signs imply. 
They also suggest, that there may be different 
sources of normative information available, and 
that available from the posted information may 
well not be the most influential. 
One puzzling aspect of these results was that 
we failed to alter drivers tendency to close fo- 
llow with posted roadside information. Because 
of this we undertook another study (see Groeger 
& Chapman 1994) in which drivers were given 
auditory warnings whenever they followed ano- 
ther vehicle at less than 1 second. The results 
were striking, drivers invariably complied with 
the warnings, although their tendency to commit 
speeding violations was not affected. This meant 
that it was indeed possible to alter tailgating be- 
haviour within AIDE, although not, apparently, 
using posted roadside information. Closer 
examination revealed, however, that all of our 
traffic conditions had relatively high incidence 
of tailgating. Thus, if the argument may above 
with regard to the greater influence of the actual 
behaviour of the other drivers encountered is 
correct, we might not have expected to see any 
effect of the posted information. Accordingly, 
we ran another series of studies in which the 
tailgating behaviour of other drivers was care- 
fully controlled. The results showed that where 
other drivers seemed to be adhering to the posted 
(tailgating) information, subjects were more 
likely to conform, but were not more likely to 
conform where other appeared not to be doing 
so. Posted tailgating information did not affect 
speeding. It should be noted that none of the tmfk 
conditions investigated actually constmi- ned subjects 
to respond in particular ways, but they neverthe- 
less chose to behave like the others they encoun- 
tered. 
More recently, we have had the opportunity to 
replicate the AIDE study which employed au- 
ditory in-car warnings under real driving condi- 
tions (see Groeger, Chapman & Stove, 1994). 
The results were as impressive as were obtained 
under laboratory conditions, i.e. drivers tenden- 
cies to follow others with a temporal gap of less 
than 1 second was significantly reduced where a 
simple auditory warning was produced whenever 
they did so. In spite of the effectiveness of this 
warning with respect to tailgating, drivers in the 
trial frequently drove in excess of the speed 
limit. This study both serves to validate some of 
the earlier laboratory based work, but also ex- 
tends it substantially, showing that some, but not 
all, ways of giving drivers advice about viola- 
tions are relatively impervious to how other dri- 
vers are behaving. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The research findings summarised above has 
considered a number of different explanations of, 
and strategies towards reducing, traffic viola- 
tions. There is little evidence that the severity of 
the penalty is itself a deterrent, especially in the 
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situations where detection or apprehension is 
unlikely. Where the likelihood, real or apparent, 
of being caught is high, so is compliance. Where 
many other are also likely to be apprehended, 
this deterrent effect appears to be reduced. Ar- 
guably, where very many people break the law 
simultaneously that law becomes unenforceable, 
thus reducing the likelihood of any individual 
being apprehended. The results of our own empi- 
rical studies suggest that the effects of public 
posting of violation information may be some- 
what unpredictable and, perhaps, artefactual. 
Compliance will depend on the aggregate level 
of compliance in the situation. Thus the informa- 
tion presented on the sign is, per se, relatively 
uninfluential. Nevertheless, given strategic pla- 
cement of signs, such as in locations where 
most drivers will be constrained to comply, e.g. 
on bends or near schools in the case speeding, 
since the aggregate level of compliance is likely 
to be high, public posting of speed information 
may well prove very effective (see Fuller, 1994). 
Unfortunately, such an approach is unlikely to 
work in the case of tailgating, since it is intrinsi- 
cally difficult to envisage situations in which in- 
ter-vehicle spacing is increased. Our studies 
make very clear that because an effort is made to 
comply with one traffic law does not mean that 
compliance will increase across all offences, even 
those as intuitively related as speed and distance 
keeping. This would seem to mitigate an expla- 
nation of earlier results, or indeed our own, in 
terms of ((implied surveillance)). Finally, the 
fact that personalised, rather than aggregate 
feedback has been found to be influential irres- 
pective of traffic conditions would appear to un- 
dermine the view that normative influences on 
traffic behaviour are particularly strong, unless 
we revise the basis on which normative beha- 
viour has its effect. It may be that in-car systems, 
such as that studied here, because they make 
clear that one’s own violations have been de- 
tected, may only serve to reinforce the idea that 
other drivers will not be the ones who will be 
apprehended. Arguably, under such circumstan- 
ces, knowing that others will not be punished 
may itself exert a very strong normative pressure 
towards compliance. 
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SUMMARY RESUMO 
This paper reviews a range of studies which have 
sought to increase drivers’ compliance with the traffic 
law. These range from: studies which have manipu- 
lated levels of enforcement to studies which have 
investigated the effects of providing drivers with infor- 
mation about current levels of compliance, to studies 
which have sought to assess the impact of different 
levels of penalty. It is concluded that the effects of nor- 
mative information are weak and inherently dependent 
on the actual behaviour of other drivers. The results 
presented further suggest that the risk of apprehension, 
which may be augmented by provision of in-car 
warnings, is most likely to be effective in increasing 
compliance. 
Neste artigo procede-se a uma revislo de estudos 
sobre o aumento da submisslo dos condutores a le- 
gisla$io de trifego. Estes v%o desde OS que manipula- 
ram diferentes niveis de control0 policial at6 aos que 
se debruqaram sobre o fornecimento aos condutores de 
informaq6es sobre OS niveis existentes de submisslo is 
normas, ou ainda at8 aos estudos sobre o irnpacto de 
diferentes graus de penalizaqlo. Conclui-se que OS 
efeitos da informaqZo normativa s%o muito reduzidos e 
sb intrinsecamente dependentes da observqb do com- 
portamento dos outros condutores. OS resultados a se- 
guir apresentados sugerem que a percepqlo imediata 
de risco e transgressb, que pode ser aumentada atravCs 
de sistemas de aviso colocados nos autom6veis, tende 
a ser mais eficaz no aumento da submisslo i s  normas. 
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